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ASSESSING QUALITY IN HIGHER EDUCATION: SOME 
CAVEATS 
 
FRANCESCO FERRANTE§ 
 
Abstract 
 
The technology of  cognitive and non-cognitive skills formation is characterized by 
the cumulative nature of learning processes and by the presence of significant 
complementarities and irreversibilities in the acquisition of such skills [Cunha and 
Heckman, 2007]. From this it follows that, in order to evaluate the quality of 
individual phases of skills formation, it is necessary to take account of the quality 
of the human capital entering the training process. It is evident that this aspect is 
more important, the more advanced the level of education. This paper evaluates the 
effects of the quality of Italian matriculants at 24 engineering faculties measured 
with the results of the CISIA standardized test on the regularity of university 
studies. The preliminary results confirm that failing to take account of the 
incoming quality of students may give rise to significant distortions in the 
evaluation of the academic productivity of universities. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
There are several reasons for the growing interest in the performance of education 
systems, in particular at tertiary level. First, the wide gaps in learning outcomes 
recorded by international surveys, such as PISA or PIAAC, are also apparent among 
countries similar by level of socioeconomic development and expenditure on education. 
Second, the rising cost of education has a weight on fragile public finances which is 
judged unsustainable in the long term. Third, especially in developing countries, the 
sharp rise in the educational attainment of the population has not been followed by an 
equivalent increase in its average quality in terms of learning achievements (Hanushek, 
2012). Finally, there is robust empirical evidence that the relationship between human 
capital and growth is explained better by learning outcomes than by the educational 
attainment of the population (Hanushek and Woesmann, 2008; 2012)  
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It is therefore understandable that, especially in underperforming countries like Italy, 
education experts and policy makers agree on the need to scrutinize the performance of 
the education institutions more closely and to implement reforms to enhance their 
efficiency and effectiveness. 
A large body of literature straddling economics and psychology shows that the 
technology of cognitive and non-cognitive skills formation is characterized by the 
cumulative nature of learning processes and by the presence of significant 
complementarities and irreversibilities in the acquisition of such skills along the 
educational production chain [Cunha and Heckman 2007]. In particular, the 
accumulation of cognitive and non-cognitive skills is characterized, especially in the 
first years of life, by the presence of feedback between the former and the latter, and by 
the fact that the further along the education production chain, the more difficult it 
becomes difficult to remedy learning deficits.        
   It is evident that this aspect is more important, the more advanced the level of 
education. Figure 1 illustrate the idea: the potential for learning at every stage of the 
chain is conditioned by the width and height of the segments of the pyramid. In 
particular, tertiary education is the level most conditioned by previous learning. Equally 
ample and consolidated is the empirical evidence on the crucial role performed by  
contextual factors in learning processes (family of origin, social and educational 
environment); factors which condition the outcomes of the latter beyond the effects of 
the quality of educational institutions and teachers.  
  It is likely that as the level of education increases, so does the weight of previous 
learning – with a concomitant decrease in the weight of contextual factors in 
conditioning the outcomes of education. This is due to the fact that, with increased age, 
cognitive and non-cognitive skills tend to stabilize and consolidate, having absorbed all 
the effects of subjective and contextual factors. 
   From this it follows that, in order to evaluate the quality of the individual phases of 
the educational process in terms of effectiveness and efficiency, account should be 
taken of the quality of the human capital entering the education system and 
measurement should be made of the value added.  
  There is a large body of literature, mainly of English-speaking origin, testifying to the 
importance given to the measurement of value added in countries where the assessment 
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of education processes and its use in the allocation of resources is most advanced [Todd 
& Wolpin 2003, Lochwood et al. 2009, Zhang, 2009; Rothestein, 2009 and 2010]. With 
regard to tertiary education in particular, Kreutzer and Wood [2007] have applied a 
methodology to rank American undergraduate business schools in terms of added 
value,1 then comparing the results with the very different classification of the same 
institutions drawn up by the magazine Business Week. Zhang [2009] has carried out a 
similar exercise in order to measure the quality, in terms of added value, of public 
colleges at state level, obtaining differentials, in comparison with Alabama, ranging 
from -10% to +40%. In this case, too, the ranking differs substantially from the one 
customarily used by families and based on the results achieved in college entry tests by 
matriculants and on the ranking of the high schools attended by the latter [Barron's, 
1988]. The author concludes that, to a large extent, the latter ranking does not reflect the 
intrinsic quality of colleges, but rather that of their students.   
   Measurement of the performance of schools using the added value criterion is largely 
restricted to the English-speaking countries. In the USA, various school districts in  
Tennessee have adopted the EVAAS (Education Value-Added Assessment System), 
and other states are experimenting with it. The Department of Education of the United 
Kingdom has for some years adopted a method based on calculation of CVA 
(Contextual Value-Added) to evaluate the performance of schools taking account of the 
numerous socio-economic and demographic factors that affect learning by pupils.  
   In Italy no such work has been conducted, and contributions by empirical analysis are 
virtually non-existent, with the exception of a recent study by Cipollone, Montaro and 
Sestito [2010] on upper-secondary schools. Also to be mentioned, given its importance 
for this area of analysis, is the study by Aini, Baici and Casalone [2010].   
   Notwithstanding the difficulties of such measurement and its limitations in evaluating 
the performance of individual teachers, the results of these studies show that, overall, 
the evaluation of educational institutions also at tertiary level – especially when it is 
believed that these should promote social mobility and geographical mobility is low – 
should take due account of the role played by contextual factors and by the quality of 
the students entering the educational system.  
                                                
1  The authors verify educational outcomes in terms of the initial salaries of the graduates from the 
business schools surveyed. 
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   The assumption of this exploratory study is that students constitute both the 
fundamental input to tertiary educational processes and their output. Consequently, 
referring in abstract to the ‘quality of universities’ without considering the quality of 
their students is methodologically inappropriate [Zhang, 2009], especially in the 
presence of high variability in the quality of secondary schools and the limited mobility 
of students. National and international surveys on the quality of primary-level learning 
(PISA, INVALSI] not only confirm the important role played by the socio-economic 
context but also depict a highly diversified pattern in Italy – both geographically and by 
type of school [Montanaro 2008]. This heterogeneity has distant origins also related to 
delays in educational processes, and especially in primary schooling [Bertola and 
Sestito 2011], which inevitably weighs on the performance of the secondary and tertiary 
education system and extends beyond differences of a socio-economic nature between 
geographical area and families of origin.  
   The analysis that follows is based on joint use of the results from the CISIA test, as 
indicative of the real quality of incoming students, and of AlmaLaurea data as regards 
the other variables. The standardized CISIA test2 verifies the extent to which 
matriculants in engineering possess the basic skills (logic, mathematics and sciences). It 
has the merit of absorbing the effects and interactions between subjective traits and 
contextual factors, yielding a measure of cognitive and non-cognitive skills at an age 
when they should be consolidated and stabilized. In view of the relatively low mobility 
among regions of matriculating students as revealed by the data, the average CISIA 
score, available only at aggregate level, can be interpreted as a proxy for the real 
                                                
2   The test consists of five sections of questions designed to verify the candidate’s basic knowledge and 
to assess his/her aptitude for engineering studies. The five sections of questions in the booklet are as 
follows: logic, reading comprehension, mathematics 1, physics and chemistry, mathematics 2. The first 
section of questions concerns logic and consists of: (a) sequences of numbers and/or figures arranged in 
an order that must be identified; (b) propositions followed by five statements of which only one follows 
logically from the premises of the proposition. The second section of questions (reading comprehension) 
consists of passages taken from texts of various genres. Each of the passages is followed by a series of 
multiple-choice questions, the answers to which must be deduced from the content of the passage. The 
third and fifth sections of questions concern mathematics. Between them is the fourth set of questions, 
which deal with physics and chemistry. The mathematics 1 section contains questions intended to test 
whether the candidate possesses the mathematical knowledge deemed essential by the faculty. The 
mathematics 2 section verifies the candidate’s skills: that is, whether or not s/he can apply the notions that 
s/he has learned. The fourth section of questions, on physics and chemistry, serves to assess the 
candidate’s knowledge and skills, but the questions are mixed: some require the possession of basic 
knowledge, while others also require applicative skills. [Synthesis drawn from the CISIA consortium 
website]. 
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average quality of the human capital possessed by the matriculants at a given 
engineering faculty.  
   The following analysis considers 24 engineering faculties of the 22 public universities 
belonging to the Almalaurea and CISIA consortia: Bari Politecnico, Basilicata, 
Bologna, Cagliari, Calabria, Cassino, Catania, Cesena e Forlì, Ferrara, Firenze, 
Modena, Napoli Seconda Università, Perugia, Reggio Calabria, Reggio Emilia, Roma 
Tre, Salento, Salerno, Sannio, Siena, Torino Politecnico, Trento, Trieste, Udine.  
   Section 2 briefly addresses issues concerning the measurement of students’ incoming 
quality and their outgoing performance. Section 3 is devoted to the estimates and 
discussion of the main results. Section 4 draws the main conclusions and implications.  
   Bearing in mind the limited aims of this exploratory exercise – which has no ambition 
to furnish a model for the evaluation of universities – as well as the space available, it 
will not be possible to give systematic treatment of the advantages and shortcomings of 
systems which use added value to assess the quality of tertiary education. This is also 
because such treatment would have to consider what are the objective functions of the 
tertiary education system in relation to which it makes sense to identify productivity 
measures. 
 
2. Measuring students’ incoming quality and their outgoing performance 
The first question that arises when setting out to measure the productivity of tertiary 
education is how to select the indicators best suited to assessing the quality of students 
at matriculation and their performance on graduation. What indicators have more 
significance, together with less distortion due to the presence of non-observable factors? 
 
2.1. Measuring incoming quality 
   The aim in this case is to select a standardized and reliable measure which absorbs all 
the information relative to the learning potential of matriculants. The first candidate for 
this function is the high-school diploma grade, which should furnish a scale of values. 
However, the PISA and INVALSI educational attainment surveys raise doubts as to the 
reliability of this metric because of marked regional differences in its use. These doubts 
are confirmed by Figure 2, which shows, by region, the average scores on the CISIA 
standardized test (scale on the left) and the corresponding average high-school diploma 
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grade (scale on the right) in the corresponding year. This is a situation well known to 
researchers, who find that schools in certain regions systematically over/underrate their 
students in comparison with the results of standardized tests.   
    Incoming quality – with the limitations of the various indicators borne in mind – was 
measured in three ways: the high-school diploma grade corrected (see section 4) on the 
basis of the average CISIA score; the high-school diploma grade and the CISIA score 
taken separately; the high-school diploma grade corrected on the basis of a procedure 
which relativizes it to the distribution of grades by school and the graduate’s region of 
provenance.3 The decision to correct the high-school diploma  grade on the basis of the 
average CISIA score was taken on the assumption that it reflects a relative scale of 
matriculants’ skills and knowledge valid at local level but which is not usable on a 
national scale. Thus calculated was a corrected or normalized indicator of the actual 
quantity of human capital possessed by graduates at matriculation obtained by 
multiplying the high-school diploma grade by  the average score on the CISIA test 
obtained by matriculants at a given faculty. This is evidently an approximation based on 
the idea that students taking the test at a given faculty have homogeneous educational 
backgrounds. 
 In the presence of high geographical mobility, the differences in quality among 
incoming students may be due to endogenous processes of self-selection: the students 
with most potential connected with better individual abilities, the quality of the upper-
secondary school attended, or a more favourable socioeconomic background, may be 
induced to enrol at universities/faculties offering better opportunities for learning and 
for employment. In this case, in order to avoid distortions in the estimates [Hanushek 
1979; Heckman et al. 1999], and in particular underestimations of the value added of 
the most valid universities/faculties, analysis should take account of the nature of the 
self-selection processes. In view of this risk, a number of preliminary checks were 
                                                
3 This is a measure developed by the AlmaLaurea researchers. The high-school diploma grade is purged 
of the ‘area of residence’ and ‘type of diploma’ effects. The variable identifies the quartile of high-school 
diploma votes, relativized with respect to the distribution of the grades by school and region, to which the 
graduate belongs. The advantage of this normalization, compared with the normalization performed using 
the CISIA data, is that it does not use a correction factor constant for all diploma-holders. On the other 
hand, it presupposes uniformity among distortionary factors at regional level which does not seem 
confirmed by the intraregional distribution of CISIA scores (figure 4). Moreover, the correction based on 
the CISIA data nakes it possible to draw more immediate inferences concerning the weight of incoming 
quality.     
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made. Their results did not support the conclusion that student mobility is characterized 
by self-selection processes. In fact, comparison between the observable characteristics 
of mobile and non-mobile students did not reveal statistically significant differences.4   
 
2.2. Measures of outgoing performance 
   Outgoing performance can be measured in terms of both the quality of the university 
career of students and graduates (dispersion rate, proportion of students earning a 
certain number of university credits, duration of studies, regularity of academic career,  
average examination grade, degree grade, effective learning verified by standardized 
tests5, etc.) and labour-market entry by graduates.6 The choice of which measure to use 
presupposes that clear agreement has been reached as to what the educational system 
should offer to individuals and society. Except for tests on learning attainment, the 
indicators of outgoing performance all suffer from the presence of non-observable 
factors that may distort the significance of the measure selected. In fact, the average 
examination grade, the degree grade, or the regularity of academic career may reflect 
differences among the assessment methods used by universities.  
   If the objective of tertiary education is solely that of furnishing human capital 
immediately usable by the production system, the labour-market entry of graduates 
variously measured (for instance, by the employment conditions of the graduate X years 
from graduation, the duration of job-searches, pay at X years from graduation, the type 
of contract, the job relevance of the degree, the graduate’s degree of job satisfaction) 
would constitute a non-distorted measure of performance, provided that account has 
been taken of the uneven geographical distribution of employment opportunities – that 
is, of local labour-market conditions7 and the mobility of graduates.  
                                                
4   The test of differences among the means led to 99% rejection of the hypothesis that there were 
differences in socioeconomic background, high-school diploma grade, normalized high-school diploma 
grade (see note 5) or the type of school attended. 
5 See in this regard the OECD’s AHELO (Assessment of Higher Education Learning Outcomes) project. 
6  Ideally, verification should be made of occupational outcomes throughout the working life, especially if 
the presence of a trade-off between short- and long-period employability is apparent as a function, for 
example, of the degree of specificity of the skills acquired from different educational programmes 
[Hanushek, Woessmann and Zhang 2011]. 
7  This conclusion is correct only if the characteristics of the jobs offered to graduates match – with 
reference to international standards –  their qualifications. If there is a widespread mismatch between 
graduates and their job ranks, difficulties of labour-market entry may be symptomatic not only of 
deficiencies in the education system but also of the technological and organizational backwardness of the 
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   Given the general importance of the regularity of academic career and its specific 
importance for the Italian university system [Brunello and Winter-Ebmer 2003; Bound 
Lovenheim and Turner 2010], this latter measure of outgoing performance has been 
selected here. It should be pointed out, however, that the regularity of academic career 
should be measured by following the careers of matriculants. But, bearing in mind the 
scant availability and reliability of data on such careers, and especially, the complexity 
of  university drop-out behaviour, it has been preferred to perform the estimates on 
graduates.8 On the other hand, specific studies [Baldissera, Galeazzi and Petrucci 2010] 
show that analysis by cohorts yields results comparable with those that obtained on the 
basis of graduates. The faculties surveyed, with their relative regularity rates calculated 
by bachelor degree, are listed in Table 1. 
   Besides those already mentioned, another limitation of the exploratory exercises 
derives from the fact that the CISIA test scores are available only as average values for 
the faculty/university. They do not describe – nor are they intended to – relations of 
causality, but rather simply ones of statistical association.  
 
4. The effect of incoming quality on outgoing performance 
It is likely that the university performance of students and, in particular, the time taken 
by them to graduate, depend – cognitive capacity remaining equal – on the quality of 
the academic institutions and, especially, on the quality of teachers and course 
programmes, on the resources used directly and indirectly to support learning 
(counselling and tutoring, study grants, accommodation, etc.), on the rigidity of the 
selection criteria applied, and on employment opportunities, whose extent can be 
approximated with the graduate unemployment rate or with pay levels in the local 
labour market – both of which are factors that influence the opportunity-cost of the time 
devoted to study [Light and Strayer 2000; Zhang 2003; Cappellari and Lucifora 2009].          
   On the basis of these hypotheses, the aim of the estimates reported here was to 
determine the factors which explain the regularity of academic career, and especially the 
                                                                                                                                          
production system due to institutional factors. Although this is a question of major importance, it cannot 
be addressed here. 
8  The importance of the CISIA score as a factor determining the regularity of  academic career is testified 
by the fact that it explains 49% of the variability in the graduates/matriculants ratio among universities 
[1% significance level].   
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weight exerted by the quality of incoming students. On the basis of the findings of a 
large body of literature on the topic, and of preliminary analyses, besides the student’s 
quality on matriculation, the other variables considered were the following: the 
educational qualifications of the parents; jobs undertaken by the graduate during his/her 
time at university and its influence (worker-student and student-worker); the time taken 
to complete the degree thesis; the motives inducing the graduate to attend university 
(cultural or professional); intentions regarding postgraduate studies; the assessments 
made by graduates on the quality of their relationship with academic staff; the average 
students/lecturer ratio during the first-degree course;9 the average regional 
unemployment rate for the 15-24 age group in both the region of residence and the 
region of the university faculty attended; and a fixed effect for the 24 universities. Two 
control variables were introduced to control for self-selection due to mobility: the first 
of them concerned regional mobility if the student was enrolled at university in a region 
different from that of residence; the second was relative to provincial mobility.  
The problem of the variability of selection standards was particularly complex. To 
capture its effect, it was assumed that such variability affects all aspects of university 
performance (regularity of academic career, examination grades, and degree grade), and 
that it impacts especially on the degree grade. On this basis, an OLS model was used to 
estimate the determinants of the degree grade, including, with the purpose of capturing 
the ‘selection standards’ variable,10 the fixed university effects. The coefficients thus 
obtained, associated with variables significant to at least 10% level – excluding those 
relative to the fixed effects – were used to obtain an ‘undistorted’ measure of the grade 
expected (Table 3). The difference between the actual degree grade and the one thus 
calculated was then used as a proxy for the effects of rigour in selection criteria on an 
individual student’s career (laxness effect). 
   As said, the measures of the incoming quality of graduates at the time of matriculation 
should have absorbed large part of the effects connected with family background and 
non-cognitive skills. It is therefore likely that the variables characterizing the latter 
                                                
9 This is an indicator that varies according to the year of matriculation. It was chosen on the idea that, 
taking account of the current system of funding allocation, the overall absorption of resources is 
correlated with the endowment of  academic staff.  
10 If selection standards are homogeneous, the fixed effects should not be significant. However, this was 
not the case of the majority of universities. The estimates are reported in Table 3. 
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(parents’ educational qualifications and social class; students’ motivations) have a 
limited explanatory capacity. As we shall see, the exploratory analyses and the estimates 
performed appear to confirm this assumption.   
   On the basis of these conjectures and preliminary calculations, estimation was made 
of a probit model in which the dependent variable was the likelihood that the graduate 
had  been regular in his/her academic career or, alternatively, had graduated with a 
delay of one or two years.11 The sample consisted of 5182 first-degree graduates 
enrolled in the 2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8 academic years and who completed their 
degree courses in the 2009/10 academic year. The CISIA score was calculated as the 
average of the 2005/6, 2006/7 and 2007/8 academic years – these being the only years 
for which data were available.  
   The independent variable in the first three models estimated was only the quality of 
human capital at matriculation measured in the three ways described (high-school 
diploma grade + average CISIA test score, average CISIA score multiplied by the high-
school diploma grade, normalized high-school diploma grade). Further explanatory 
variables were then added, taking into account that the average CISIA score does not 
allow the introduction of the fixed university effects. Table 4 sets out the results. 
   The variables significant to at least 10% exhibit the expected sign, except for the 
unemployment rate in the region of the university attended. All the measures of the 
quality of human capital on entry are significant to at least 1% level in all estimates. In 
particular, the score on the CISIA test, which is considered more accurately to reflect 
the learning potential of matriculants, has marked effects on the regularity of academic 
career. It should be pointed out that the estimates made on the basis of the two different 
ways to correct the high-school diploma grade yielded entirely similar indications. In 
model (7), one point more than the average score on the CISIA test determined an 
increase in the probability of graduating on time equal to 2.1% for a diploma-holder 
with the minimum grade (66) and to 3.2% for a diploma-holder with the grade of 100 
[1% significant level]. Hence, in this latter case, an increase in the score of one standard 
deviation determines a 12.8% increase in the probability.  
                                                
11  This choice was determined by  the availability of data on the CISIA test. It obviously has drawbacks 
in that it excludes from the calculation the (small) proportion of students who graduated with more than 
two years of delay. In support of our analysis, this proportion does not significantly vary among 
universities.   
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   Among the variables imputable to teaching quality, the results confirm – within a 
general pattern of this indicator’s high variability among universities – the positive 
contribution of the student/lecturer ratio to the regularity of academic career [1% 
significance level]. Also positive and highly significant is the contribution of the 
perceived quality of relations between lecturers and students [1% significance level]. 
There may be various explanations for this result. Firstly, it may depend on the fact that 
culturally motivated graduates are also those who most appreciate good relations with 
academic staff. Secondly, the cause may be the fact that more capable teachers are 
better able to motivate their students. The finding that the coefficient is still significant 
when also controlling for motivation seems to confirm the latter hypothesis.  
   Also borne out is the hypothesis that the presence of heterogeneity in selection criteria 
(laxness effect) contributes to explaining the variability of outgoing performance [1% 
significance]: in particular, as expected, more generous criteria are associated with a 
higher probability of graduating on time.  
   Whilst the prevalence of cultural motivations in the choice of academic programme, 
compared with both cultural and professional motivations, exerts a positive effect on 
regularity [5% significance], the prevalence of vocational motivations exerts a negative 
effect [5% significance]. As expected, the effect of the ‘intention-to-continue-studies’ 
variable is both positive and significant [1%], and associated with this variable is a 24% 
increase in the probability of graduating on time.     
   As might be expected, a job has a negative impact on the regularity of academic 
career [5% significance], especially in the case of worker-students (-20%), whereas in 
the case of student-workers the decrease in the probability of graduating on time is 
rather small (-4.8%). Also of interest is the effect on the unemployment rate. Firstly, the 
estimates show that both the unemployment rates considered are significant, with a 
decidedly greater impact of the region of university attendance. Hence, the labour-
market conditions in the area where the university is situated seem to have greater 
influence on the behaviours of students than the area of residence. Secondly, whilst the 
relation with the unemployment rate in the region of residence is, as expected, negative, 
the relation with the unemployment rate in the region of the university attended is 
positive and non-linear: it is positive for unemployment rates lower than around 28% 
and negative above that value. There are two main explanations for this odd result. The 
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first concerns the fact that, as the unemployment rate decreases, so job opportunities 
while attending university increase – an explanation borne out by the fact that the 
incidence of work while studying  is greater in the universities of the Centre-North: a 
greater propensity to work evidently has a negative effect on the regularity of academic 
career. The second explanation concerns the idea that, in local labour markets with 
higher unemployment, where job-search processes are longer and more complex, the 
value of the ‘graduated on time’ signal increases. Overall, the expected negative effect 
due to the lower opportunity cost of time is therefore off-set by these two positive 
effects for values of the unemployment rate less than 28%.  
   Confirming the above-discussed conjectures, mobility is not an explanatory variable 
for differences in outgoing performance.  
   The fixed university effects are almost all significant at 1% level. Taking account of 
the limited time horizon considered, they can be considered approximate measures of 
the added value of universities – that is, their net contribution to the regularity of 
academic career by their graduates. On the basis of this measure obtained from model 
(9) but also substantially confirmed by model (6), verification was made of whether and 
to what extent the ranking of universities changed in comparison with the one based on 
the raw data – that is, the actual rates of regularity. This comparison evidenced 
substantial differences between the two rankings: the absolute mean variation of 
positions was 7.5, with a maximum of 21 positions of difference.12   
 
3. Conclusions and implications 
This econometric exercises show that the quality of learning at upper-secondary school 
has a significant impact on the regularity of academic career by matriculants at 
engineering faculties. Teaching quality and selection standards remaining equal, if the 
average score achieved on the CISIA entry test by a student with average characteristics 
increases by one standard deviation, then his/her probability of graduating on time 
increases by 12%. The most immediate implication of this result is that, once the 
outgoing performance of graduates has been purged of the effects of the quality of the 
incoming students and of the other significant factors, the ranking of universities in 
                                                
12  The new ranking was robust to various specifications. 
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terms of their students’ regularity of academic career changes radically in comparison 
with the regularity in the absence of such adjustment. 
   The classification thus obtained has indubitably been distorted by heterogeneity 
among the assessment standards of faculties not captured by the empirical models used. 
Yet this shortcoming does not affect the overall validity of the lesson to be learned from 
the exercise: namely, that not taking account of the quality of incoming students may 
distort the evaluation of the university system and, consequently, the allocation of funds 
on the basis of meritocratic criteria.  
   The essential issue often evaded when the quality of educational systems is discussed 
is that students are both the fundamental inputs and outputs of educational processes 
[Light and Strayer, 2003]. Hence, referring in abstract to the ‘quality of  universities’, 
without considering the quality of the latter in the presence of scant student mobility, is 
methodologically inappropriate. These considerations also apply, albeit to a lesser 
extent, to the output and assessment of university research, the quality of which depends 
at least partially on the quality of the feedbacks between teaching and research.        
     Measures of the outgoing performance of students and graduates are of great interest 
to families, universities, and firms, but they should be given less importance by policy-
makers intending to use them to allocate funds. Just as a firm is interested in strategies 
to increase its added value more than sales by employee, so policy-makers should be 
interested in allocating public resources according to the capacities of universities to 
enhance their inputs, rather than on the basis of results concerning their outputs 
(dispersion rate, regularity of academic career, labour-market entry, etc.). It is no 
coincidence that an educational system’s performance is most commonly measured on 
the basis of value added in countries where the culture of assessment is more 
consolidated. 
   These conclusions acquire greater value with the transition from tertiary education 
systems characterized by strong homogeneity among matriculants to systems with 
broader entry – like those towards which the OECD countries and Europe have been 
moving in the past twenty to thirty years, and which are inevitably characterized by 
greater heterogeneity. This prospect has been confirmed by the Europe 2020 document, 
which sets a 40% target for the proportion of graduates in the 30-34 age group.  
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   In the presence of significant differences among starting conditions, there is a  risk 
that the superficial use of assessments based on outgoing performance indicators, and 
thus conditioned by the scant availability of information and its cost, will, on the one 
hand, reward universities which, though not particularly virtuous, enjoy more 
favourable conditions and, on the other, remove valuable resources – in a chronically 
under-funded system –  from universities which, though situated in more disadvantaged 
areas, operate virtuously. 
     Meritocratic criteria in the allocation of public funds among schools and  universities 
which do not take account of these considerations, in the absence of effective means to 
support the right to study (especially in the form of grants and an adequate university 
building programme) would exacerbate the polarization of the educational systems. 
They would penalize the least mobile students, regardless of their talent, and especially 
those from the more disadvantaged social groups, and schools/universities in more 
backward areas independently of the merits/deficiencies of their personnel. In this 
regard, it should be borne in mind that mobility is due not only to economic factors but 
also to social and cultural barriers on which the introduction of economic incentives 
would have little effect. Empirical evidence on the concreteness of these risks, in a high-
mobility country like the USA, has been provided by Bound, Lovenheim and Turner 
[2010] in an article which shows how the longer time taken to graduate by 
disadvantaged social groups is due in large part to cutbacks in the resources made 
available to the public educational institutions in the USA.  
   The problem is made even more urgent, in some countries like Italy, by the fact that, 
for numerous universities, the lower quality of incoming students is associated with 
fewer opportunities to acquire funding through both external sources and increased 
university fees. Thus, in practice, the distribution of resources is already 
disproportionately tipped against those universities regardless of their productivity.  
   These considerations would be less important in countries characterized by high rates 
of graduation, and if both increased access to tertiary-level studies and the promotion of 
social mobility were not given priority over the pursuit of excellence and the 
enhancement of talents.  This latter strategy would not entail relinquishing a socially 
inclusive university system.  
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FIGURE 1. The pyramid of the education production chain 
 
 
 
 
 
FIGURE 2. CISIA scores (PT) and high-school diploma grades (VDIP) by region 
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TABLE 1. Shares of students graduating on time, average CISIA scores and high-
school diploma grades by faculty  
University 
% students 
on time 
 
Average 
CISIA score 
Average 
high-
school 
diploma 
grade 
 
Bari Politecnico 39.0% 27.3 92.5 
Basilicata 20.0% 18.3 86.4 
Bologna 56.9% 26.9 88.6 
Cagliari 34.4% 19.2 91.3 
Calabria 38.3% 15.3 94.0 
Cassino 59.5% 16.8 89.6 
Catania 27.1% 19.9 91.3 
Cesena e Forlì 52.4% 26.8 91.1 
Ferrara 45.6% 27.1 89.2 
Firenze 29.8% 26.8 89.1 
Modena 66.9% 28.6 87.7 
Napoli Seconda Università 33.7% 17.3 92.1 
Perugia 41.6% 25.2 91.9 
Reggio Calabria 13.3% 17.3 95.4 
Reggio Emilia 52.5% 24.7 84.1 
Roma Tre 35.6% 21.7 88.4 
Salento 24.5% 21.9 94.2 
Salerno 39.8% 19.1 93.1 
Sannio 45.9% 17.2 93.3 
Siena 56.1% 23.7 89.7 
Torino Politecnico 59.2% 26.1 90.2 
Trento 47.3% 26.0 86.8 
Trieste 57.9% 28.5 88.5 
Udine 49.1% 28.9 86.8 
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TABLE 2. Descriptive statistics 
Variable Observation Mean/frequency 
Standard 
dev. Min Max 
Students on time 5182 0.476457 0.4994936 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: no reply 5182 0.0144732 0.1194423 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: none 5182 0.0061752 0.0783471 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: 
elementary certificate 5182 0.0453493 0.2080891 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: lower-
secondary certificate 5182 0.2271324 0.4190193 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: upper-
secondary diploma 5182 0.4884215 0.4999142 0 1 
Mother’s educational qualification: degree 5182 0.2184485 0.4132332 0 1 
Average CISIA test score 5182 2.443915 4.031922 15.31 28.99 
Time taken to complete thesis (months) 4738 3.379485 1.743754 1 24 
High-school diploma grade  5182 90.29718 1.063003 60 100 
Regional mobility 5182 0.2005017 0.4004144 0 1 
Mobility among provinces 5182 0.4500193 0.4975437 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: no reply 5182 0.0148591 0.1210007 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: none 5182 0.0050174 0.0706623 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: 
elementary certificate  5182 0.0447704 0.2068193 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: lower-
secondary certificate  5182 0.2473948 0.4315398 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: upper-
secondary diploma 5182 0.4540718 0.4979342 0 1 
Father’s educational qualification: degree 5182 0.2338865 0.4233417 0 1 
Satisfaction relationship with academic staff 5182 3.977229 0.5977686 1 5 
Unemployment rate 15-24 years region of 
study  5197 21.02 10.11752 7.3 40.3 
Unemployment rate 15-24 years region of 
residence 5158 22.09 10.23336 7.3 40.3 
Students/lecturer ratio 5182 27.94724     4.014305 15 37 
Graduates/matriculants ratio 5182 47.58456 9.653872 18.2 81 
Sex 5182 1.249518 0.4327756 1 2 
Classical high school diploma  5181 .0521135 .2222773 0 1 
Scientific high school diploma 5181 .6352056 .4814189 0 1 
Technical institute diploma 5182 0.2886916 0.453198 0 1 
Other diploma 5182 0.0102277 0.1006234 0 1 
Average examination grade 5182 25.38593 1.931394 18 30 
Worker-student 5165 0.0118103 0.1080418 0 1 
Student-worker 5165 0.5512101 0.4974188 0 1 
Importance of cultural motivation 5164 1.712239 0.4527632 1 2 
Importance of vocational motivation 5159 1.730762 0.443607 1 2 
 
 
TAB. 3. Degree grade estimation model 
 
 Coef. Std. Err. P>t 
Average examination grade 3.736514 .0156624 0.000 
Mother’s educational qualification  0.018463 .0332103 0.578 
Father’s educational qualification 0.025314 .0327756   0.44 
 20 
Normalized high-school diploma grade 0.098857 .0340454    0.004 
Cultural motivation 0.112996 .0583714     0.000 
Vocational motivation 0.107508 .059226     0.07 
Worker-student -0.72192 .2448252    0.003 
Student-worker -0.08925 .0530902   0.000 
Intention to continue studies 0.507028 .1239201    0.000 
Constant 3.493664 .4922992     0.000 
Fixed university effects yes   
 
 
Number of observation 5091 
F( 33,  5057) 2471.32 
Prob > F 0.0000 
R-squared 0.9416 
Adj R-squared 0.9412 
 
 
TABLE 4. Results of the estimates (marginal effects = dF/dx) 
Variable Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
High-school diploma grade  0.010433***     
Average CISIA score 0.02047***     
Diploma grade x average Cisia score/100  .002807***  .004561382***  
Normalized high-school diploma grade    .1014339***  .119552*** 
Mother’s educational qualification       
Father’s educational qualification       
Time taken to complete thesis       
Mobility among regions      
Mobility among provinces      
Sex (default =woiman)      
Diploma (default: high school): technical institute      
Other diploma      
Laxness effect      
Worker-student      
Student-worker      
Students/lecturer ratio      
Cultural motivation      
Vocational motivation      
Intention to continue studies      
Satisfaction relationship with academic staff       
Unemployment rate region of study      
Unemployment rate region of study2      
Unemployment rate region of residence      
Fixed university effects  no no no yes yes 
Number of observations 5182 5182 5131 5136 5086 
Wald chi2 327 288 138 533 445 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.0456 0.0402 0.0194 0.0836 0.0701 
Variable Model 6 Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 
High-school diploma grade      
Average CISIA score     
Diploma grade x average Cisia score/100  0.00323254*** 0.00323037*** 0.00318043*** 
Normalized high-school diploma grade  .0825219***    
Mother’s educational qualification  .0260529** .025341** .027856** .0271092** 
Father’s educational qualification  .0004234 -.0014892 -.0012655 -.0037058 
 21 
Time taken to complete thesis  -.0339655*** -.0345911*** -.0335619*** -.0344663*** 
Mobility among regions .0232654 .027305 .0290692 .03222587 
Mobility among provinces -.12046 -.0140839 -.016818 -.016242 
Sex (default =woiman) -.018982 -.0318765 -.0315165 -.0295291 
Diploma (default: high school): technical institute -.1251850*** -.1115153*** -.1077563*** -.1055233*** 
Other diploma .-1970871** -.1935436** -.1891509** -.1854622** 
Laxness effect .0391198*** .0368793*** .0358162*** .0367818*** 
Worker-student -.2024576** -.1883649** -.1947163** -.2048117** 
Student-worker -.0472653** -.0417852* -.0450216** -.0478308** 
Students/lecturer ratio -.1646115*** -.1661474*** -.1679859***  
Cultural motivation .0365749* .0359484* .0504265** .049493** 
Vocational motivation -.045779** -.0436516** -.0400909* -.0429317** 
Intention to continue studies -.2444911*** -.2450889*** -.2447923*** -.2445061*** 
Satisfaction relationship with academic staff  .0709349*** .0713582***   
Unemployment rate region of study .0810372*** .8089471*** .810715*** .8063813*** 
Unemployment rate region of study2 -0.149106*** -.0148601*** -.0148853*** -.0146425*** 
Unemployment rate region of residence -.0055868*** -.0063887*** -.0061919*** -.0062262*** 
Fixed university effects  yes yes yes yes 
Number of observations 4621 4621 4621 4621 
Wald chi2 2311 2293 2292 2092 
Prob> chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 
Pseudo R2 0.3694 0.3732 0.3702 0.3629 
***= sig. 1%; **= sig. 5%; *= sig. 10%, Robust standard errors 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
